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We study collusion within groups in noncooperative games. The primitives are
the preferences of the players, their assignment to nonoverlapping groups, and
the goals of the groups. Our notion of collusion is that a group coordinates the
play of its members among different incentive compatible plans to best achieve
its goals. Unfortunately, equilibria that meet this requirement need not exist. We
instead introduce the weaker notion of collusion constrained equilibrium. This al-
lows groups to put positive probability on alternatives that are suboptimal for the
group in certain razor’s edge cases where the set of incentive compatible plans
changes discontinuously. These collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a
subset of the correlated equilibria of the underlying game. We examine four per-
turbations of the underlying game. In each case,we show that equilibria in which
groups choose the best alternative exist and that limits of these equilibria lead to
collusion constrained equilibria. We also show that for a sufficiently broad class
of perturbations, every collusion constrained equilibrium arises as such a limit.
We give an application to a voter participation game that shows how collusion
constraints may be socially costly.
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1. Introduction
As the literature on collective action (for example, Olson 1965) emphasizes, groups often
behave collusively while the preferences of individual group members limit the possi-
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ble collusive arrangements that a group can enter into. Neither individual rationality—
ignoring collusion—nor group rationality—ignoring individual incentives—provides a
satisfactory theory of interaction between groups. We study what happens when collu-
sive groups face internal incentive constraints. Our starting point is that of a standard
finite simultaneous move noncooperative game. We suppose that players are exoge-
nously partitioned into groups and that these groups have well defined objectives. Given
the play of the other groups, there may be several Nash equilibria within a particular
group (within-group equilibria). We model collusion within that group by supposing
that the group will agree to choose the within-group equilibrium that best satisfies its
objectives.
The idea of choosing a best outcome for a group subject to incentive constraints has
not received a great deal of theoretical attention, but is important in applications. It
has been used in the study of trading economics, for example, by Hu et al. (2009). In
industrial organization, Fershtman and Judd (1986) study a duopoly where owners em-
ploy managers. Kopel and Löffler (2012) use a similar setting to explore asymmetries.
Balasubramanian and Bhardwaj (2004) study a duopoly where manufacturing and mar-
keting managers bargain with each other. In other settings, the group could be a group of
bidders in an auction, as in McAfee and McMillan (1992) and Caillaud and Jéhiel (1998),
or it might consist of a supervisor and agent in the principal/supervisor/agent model
of Tirole (1986).1 In political economy, Levine and Modica’s (2016) model of peer pres-
sure and its application to the role of political parties in elections by Levine and Mat-
tozzi (2016) use the same notion of collusion. In mechanism design, a related idea is
that within a mechanism, a particular group must not wish to recontract in an incentive
compatible way. A theoretical study along these lines is Myerson (1982).2
The key problem that we address is that strict collusion constrained equilibria in
which groups simultaneously try to satisfy their goals subject to incentive constraints
do not generally exist. That is, if groups take the actions of other groups as given and
choose the best Nash equilibrium within the group, no equilibrium may exist. Exam-
ple 1 illustrates. For this reason, applied theorists have generally either avoided impos-
ing individual incentive constraints on group actions or else invented ad hoc solutions
to the existence problem.3 We show that the existence problem is due to the discontinu-
ity of the within-group equilibrium correspondence and show how it can be overcome
1See also the more general literature on hierarchical models discussed in Tirole (1992) or Celik (2009).
For other types of mechanisms, see Laffont and Martimort (1997) and Martimort and Moreira (2010). Most
of these papers study a single collusive group. One exception is Che and Kim (2009), who allow multiple
groups they refer to as cartels. In the theory of clubs, such as Cole and Prescott (1997) and Ellickson et al.
(2001), collusion takes place implicitly within (many) clubs, but the clubs interact in a market rather than a
game environment.
2Myerson also observes that there is an existence problem and introduces the notion of quasi-
equilibrium to which our collusion constrained equilibrium is closely connected. This link is explored in
greater detail below. We emphasize that while our notion of equilibrium and existence result are similar to
Myerson’s, unlike Myerson, our primary focus is on examining what is captured by the notion of equilibrium
and, consequently, on whether it makes sense.
3For example, in the collusion in auction literature as stated in Harrington (2008), it is assumed that
noncolluding firms will act the same in an industry with a cartel as they would without a cartel.
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by allowing, under certain razor’s edge conditions, randomizations by groups between
alternatives to which they are not indifferent. This leads to what we call collusion con-
strained equilibrium. This is a special type of correlated equilibrium of the underlying
noncooperative game.
Our key goal is to motivate our definition of collusion constrained equilibrium. We
argue that it is useful because it correctly captures several different types of small influ-
ences that might not be convenient to model explicitly. Specifically we consider three
perturbations of the underlying model. We first consider models in which there is slight
randomness in group beliefs about the play of other groups. This provides a formal ver-
sion of the informal arguments we use to motivate the definition. We then consider
models in which groups may overcome incentive constraints at a substantial enforce-
ment cost; that is, group members are allowed take suboptimal nonequilibrium actions,
but the group must bear enforcement costs to induce them to do so.4 For both of these
perturbations, strict collusion constrained equilibria exist5—in particular randomiza-
tion occurs only when there is indifference—and as the perturbation vanishes, the equi-
libria of the perturbed games converge to collusion constrained equilibria of the under-
lying game. Finally, we explore the Nash program of motivating a cooperative concept
as a limit of noncooperative games. Specifically, we consider a model in which there is a
noncooperative metagame played between “leaders” and “evaluators” of groups and in
which leaders have a slight valence.6 If we call the leaders principals, this formulation
is the closest to the models used in mechanism design. In the leader/evaluator game,
perfect Bayesian equilibria exist and, as the valence approaches zero, once again the
equilibrium play path converges to a collusion constrained equilibria of the underlying
game.
These upper hemicontinuity results with respect to the three perturbations show
that the set of collusion constrained equilibria is “big enough” in the sense of containing
the limits of equilibria of several interesting perturbed models. The second key ques-
tion we address is whether the set of collusion constrained equilibria is “too big” in the
sense that perhaps not all collusion constrained equilibria arise as such limits: indeed,
we could capture all relevant limits trivially by defining everything to be an equilibrium.
Could there be a stronger notion of equilibrium that still captures the relevant limits?
For any particular perturbation, the answer is “yes”: we show in a simple example that
4Collusion constrained equilibrium allows groups to put positive probability on alternatives that are sub-
optimal for the group in certain cases. The model of costly enforcement does not allow this, but instead
allows individual group members to play suboptimal but nearly optimal strategies.
5There is a certain irony here: using enforcement to overcome incentive constraints is quite natural in
a principal–agent setting. This result shows that even if enforcement is quite costly, the existence problem
noted by Myerson (1982) in the principal–agent setting goes away. Alternatively, if enforcement is quite
costly, it is natural to work with the limiting case where enforcement is not possible, and our results show
that collusion constrained—or quasi—equilibrium correctly captures what happens in that case.
6A related class of models, for example, Hermalin (1998), Dewan and Myatt (2008), and Bolton et al.
(2013), examines leadership in which a group benefits from its members coordinating their actions in the
presence of imperfect information about the environment. In this literature, however, there is no game be-
tween groups: the problem is how to exploit the information being acquired by leader and group members
in the group interest. For example, Bolton et al. (2013) find that the leader should not put too much weight
on the information coming from followers (what they call resoluteness of the leader).
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limits from perturbed games lead to strict refinements, that is, subsets, of collusion con-
strained equilibria, albeit different refinements depending on which perturbation we
consider. Is it also the case that the set of collusion constrained equilibria is too big
because some collusion constrained equilibria do not arise as any limit from interest-
ing perturbed games? In our final theoretical result, we show that this is not the case.
We consider a combination of two perturbations—a belief and an enforcement cost
perturbation—and, to eliminate nongeneric preferences, we also allow a perturbation to
the group objective. Once again, in these perturbed games, strict collusion constrained
equilibria exist and converge to collusion constrained equilibria of the underlying game.
However, for this broader class of perturbations, we have the converse as well: all collu-
sion constrained equilibria of the underlying game arise as such limits. Hence our key
conclusion: the set of collusion constrained equilibria is “exactly the right size,” being
characterized as the set of limit points of strict collusion constrained equilibria for this
broad yet relevant class of perturbations.
In our theory, incentive constraints play a key role. In applied work the presence
of incentive constraints within groups has often been ignored. For example, political
economists and economic historians often treat competing groups as single individu-
als: it is as if the group has an unaccountable leader who makes binding decisions for
the group. In Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2000) theory of the extension of the franchise,
there are two groups, the elites and the masses, who act without incentive constraints.
Similarly in the current literature on the role of taxation by the monarchy that leads to
more democratic institutions, the game typically involves a monarch and a group (the
elite).7 In our leader/evaluator perturbation, we also assume that the group decision is
made by a single leader, but we add to the game evaluators who punish the leader for
violating incentive constraints. We focus on strategic interaction between groups, and a
central element of our model is accountability, in that a leader whose recommendations
are not endorsed by the group will be punished.
We should emphasize that there is an important territory between ignoring incen-
tive constraints entirely and requiring as we do that they always be satisfied. An im-
portant example that we study explicitly is the possibility that incentive constraints can
be overcome—for example, through an enforcement mechanism—albeit at some cost.
Here we can view “no incentive constraints” as “no cost of enforcement” on the one
extreme and “incentive constraints must always be satisfied” as “very high cost of en-
forcement” on the other. One result that we establish is to give conditions on costly
enforcement such that strict collusion constrained equilibria do exist. More broadly our
contribution is oriented toward applications where incentive constraints cannot easily
be overcome.
One branch of the game theory literature that is closely connected to the ideas we
develop here is the literature that uses noncooperative methods to analyze coopera-
tive games. There, however, the emphasis has been on the endogenous formation of
coalitions, generally in the absence of incentive constraints. The Ray and Vohra (1997)
7Hoffman and Rosenthal (2000) explicitly assume that the monarch and the elite act as single agents,
and this assumption seems to be accepted by later writers such as Dincecco et al. (2011).
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model of coalition formation contains in it a theory of how exogenously given groups
play a game among themselves. The present paper may be viewed as a simple building
block for their theory of coalition formation. With exogenous groups, an equilibrium in
their model requires groups to play strategy profiles that, given the behavior of the other
groups, cannot be Pareto improved. Notice that there are no incentive constraints.8
Our analysis is at a lower level: we look for a reasonable solution when a partition of
players is exogenously given and groups interact with each other strategically, keeping
within-group incentive compatibility constraints. There is also an extensive literature
that describes the game by means of a characteristic function and involves proposals
and bargaining. We work in a framework of implicit or explicit coordination among
group members in a noncooperative game among groups. This is similar in spirit to
Bernheim et al.’s (1987) variation on strong Nash equilibrium, which they call coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. However, the details, goals, and analysis are quite different:
while we analyze deviations by a fixed group for a given partition, Bernheim et al. (1987)
consider any coalitional deviation and analyze which deviations are credible.9
To make the theory more concrete, we study an example based on the voter par-
ticipation model of Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) and Levine and Mattozzi (2016). We
consider two parties—one larger than the other—voting over a transfer payment and
we depart slightly from the standard model by assuming that ties are costly. In this set-
ting, we find all the Nash equilibria, all the collusion constrained equilibria, and all the
equilibria in which the groups have a costless enforcement technology. We study how
the equilibria compare as the stakes are increased. The main findings for this game are
the following. For small stakes, nobody votes. For larger stakes in Nash equilibrium, it is
always possible for the small party to win. If the stakes are large enough in collusion con-
strained and costless enforcement equilibrium, the large party preempts the small and
wins the election. For intermediate stakes, strict collusion constrained equilibria do not
exist, but collusion constrained equilibria do. For most parameter configurations, the
collusion constrained equilibria are more favorable for the large party than Nash equi-
librium, less favorable than costless enforcement equilibrium, and less efficient than
either.
2. A motivating example
The simplest—and, as indicated in the Introduction, a widely used—theory of collusion
is one in which players are exogenously divided into groups subject to incentive con-
straints. The basic idea we explore in this paper is that if, given the play of other groups,
there is more than one within-group equilibrium, then a collusive group should be able
to agree or coordinate on their “most desired” equilibrium.
8Haeringer (2004) points out that the assumption of quasi-concave utility is insufficient in guaranteeing
equilibrium existence in the Ray and Vohra (1997) setup with exogenous groups unless the groups can play
within-group correlated strategies. The nonexistence problem in our setup is of an entirely different nature
and, in particular, is independent of whether groups can play correlated strategies.
9Because coalitions are not predefined, the existence problem for coalition-proof Nash equilibrium is
more akin to the problem of an empty core than to the continuity problems discussed here.
312 Dutta, Levine, and Modica Theoretical Economics 13 (2018)
Example 1. We start with an example with three players. The first two players form a
collusive group while the third acts independently. The obvious condition to impose
in this setting is that given the play of player 3, players 1 and 2 should agree on the
incentive compatible (mixed) action profile that gives them the most utility. However, in
the following game there is no equilibrium that satisfies this prescription.
Each player chooses one of two actions, C or D, and the payoffs can be written in
bi-matrix form. If player 3 plays C, the payoff matrix for the actions of players 1 and
2 is a symmetric prisoner’s dilemma game in which player 3 prefers that 1 and 2 both
cooperate (play C):
C D
C 665 080
D 800 220
If player 3 plays D, the resulting payoffs are as follows, where notice that players 1 and 2
are then in a coordination game:
C D
C 10100 085
D 805 225
Let αi denote the probability with which player i plays C. We examine the set of
within-group equilibria for players 1 and 2 given the strategy α3 of player 3. The payoff
matrix for those two players is
C D
C 6+ 4(1− α3)6+ 4(1− α3) 08
D 80 22
so that as α3 starts at 1, the two players face a prisoner’s dilemma game with a unique
within-group Nash equilibrium at DD, and as α3 decreases, the payoff to cooperation
is increasing until at α3 = 1/2 the game becomes a coordination game and the set of
within-group equilibria changes discontinuously with a second pure strategy within-
group equilibrium at CC; for α3 < 1/2, there is an additional symmetric strictly mixed
within-group equilibrium in which α1 = α2 = 1/2(1− α3).
How should the group of player 1 and player 2 collude given the play of player 3?
Let us suppose that the group objective satisfies the Pareto criterion. If α3 > 1/2, they
have no choice: there is only one within-group equilibrium at DD. For α3 ≤ 1/2, they
each get 6+ 4(1− α3) at the CC within-group equilibrium, 2 at the DD within-group
equilibrium, and strictly less than 6+ 4(1− α3) at the strictly mixed within-group equi-
librium. So if α3 ≤ 1/2, they should choose CC. Notice that in this example there is no
ambiguity about the preferences of the group: they unanimously agree which is the best
within-group equilibrium. We may summarize the play of the group by the “group best
response.” If α3 > 1/2, then the group plays DD, while if α3 ≤ 1/2, the group plays CC.
What is the best response of player 3 to the play of the group? When the group plays
DD, player 3 should play D and so α3 = 0, which is not larger than 1/2; when the group
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plays CC, player 3 should play C and so α3 = 1, which is not less than or equal to 1/2.
Hence, there is no equilibrium of the game in which the group of player 1 and player 2
chooses the best within-group equilibrium given the play of player 3. ♦
In this example, the nonexistence of an equilibrium in which player 1 and player
2 collude is driven by the discontinuity in the group best response: a small change in
the probability of α3 leads to an abrupt change in the behavior of the group, for as α3 is
increased slightly above 05, the CC within-group equilibrium abruptly vanishes. The
key idea of this paper is that this discontinuity is a shortcoming of the model rather than
an intrinsic feature of the underlying group behavior. To motivate our proposed alter-
native, let us step back for a moment to consider mixed strategy equilibria in ordinary
finite games. There also the best response changes abruptly as beliefs pass through the
critical point of indifference, albeit with the key difference that at the critical point, ran-
domization is allowed. But the abrupt change in the best response function still does
not make sense from an economic point of view. A standard perspective on this is that
of Harsanyi (1973) purification or, more concretely, the limit of McKelvey and Palfrey’s
(1995) quantal response equilibria: the underlying model is perturbed in such a way
that as indifference is approached, players begin to randomize and the probability with
which each action is taken is a smooth function of beliefs; in the limit as the perturba-
tion becomes small, only the randomization remains. Similarly, in the context of group
behavior, it makes sense that as the beliefs of a group change the probability with which
they play, different within-group equilibria varies continuously. Consider, for example,
α3 = 0499 versus α3 = 0501. In a practical setting where nobody actually knows α3, does
it make sense to assert that, in the former case, players 1 and 2 with probability 1 agree
that α3 ≤ 05 and, in the latter case, that α3 > 05? We think it makes more sense that they
might in the first case agree that α3 ≤ 05 with 90% probability and mistakenly agree that
α3 > 05 with 10% probability, and conversely in the second case. Consequently, when
α3 = 0499 there would nevertheless be a 10% chance that the group would choose to
play DD not realizing that CC is incentive compatible, while when α3 = 0501, there
would be a 10% chance that they would choose to play CC incorrectly thinking that it
is incentive compatible.
We develop below a formal model in which groups have beliefs that are a random
function of the true play of the other groups and are only approximately correct. For
the moment we expect, as in Harsanyi (1973), that in that limit only the randomization
will remain. Our first step is to introduce a model that captures this limit: we simply
assume that randomization is possible at the critical point. In the example we assert
that when α3 = 05 and the incentive constraint exactly binds, the equilibrium “assigns”
a probability to CC being the within-group equilibrium.10 That is, when the incentive
constraint holds exactly, we do not assume that the group can choose their most pre-
ferred within-group equilibrium, but instead we assume that there is an endogenously
determined probability that they will choose that within-group equilibrium. In this case,
10This is similar to Simon and Zame’s (1990) endogenous choice of sharing rules.
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optimality for player 3 requires her to be indifferent between C and D, so in the “collu-
sion constrained” equilibrium, we propose the group will mix 50–50 between CC and
DD; player 3 mixes 50–50 between C and D.
The import of collusion constraints can be seen by comparing what happens in this
game without collusion. This game has three Nash equilibria: one at DDD, one in
which player 3 plays D and players 1 and 2 mix 50–50 between C and D, and a fully
mixed one.11 In the first, the group members each get 2, in the second get 5, and in the
third get 625. By contrast, in the unique collusion constrained equilibrium, the group
members each get 5. Moreover, in the completely mixed Nash equilibrium player 3 gets
2.5 exactly as in the unique collusion constrained equilibrium. Why do not the group
members get together and promise player 3 not to collude and instead coordinate on
the completely mixed Nash equilibrium? They will be better off and player 3 is indiffer-
ent. The problem is that by saying that player 1 and 2 form a group, we mean that they
cannot credibly commit not to collude. If such an agreement was reached with player
3, as soon as the meeting was over players 1 and 2 would convene a second meeting
among themselves and agree that rather than mixing they will play CC. Anticipating
this, player 3 would never make the original agreement. It would be convenient for pub-
lic policy if lobbying groups, such as bankers and farmers, could credibly commit not
to collude among themselves. Unfortunately this is not the world we live in; hence the
need to consider collusion constraints.
Remark. Discontinuity and nonexistence are not an artifact of restricting attention to
within-group Nash equilibrium. The same issue arises if we assume that players 1 and 2
can use correlated strategies. When the game is a prisoner’s dilemma, that is, α3 > 1/2,
then strict dominance implies that the unique within-group Nash equilibrium is also the
unique within-group correlated equilibrium. When α3 ≤ 1/2, the within-group corre-
lated equilibrium set is indeed larger than the within-group Nash equilibrium set (con-
taining at the very least the public randomizations over the within-group Nash equilib-
ria), but these within-group correlated equilibria are all inferior for players 1 and 2 to
CC, and so will never be chosen. While it is true that the correlated equilibrium corre-
spondence is better behaved than the Nash equilibrium correspondence—it is convex
valued and upper hemicontinuous—this example shows that the selection from that
correspondence that chooses the best equilibrium for the group is nevertheless badly
behaved: it is discontinuous.
The bad behavior of the best equilibrium correspondence is related to some of the
earliest work on competitive equilibrium. Arrow and Debreu (1954) showed that the best
choice from a constraint set is well behaved when the constraint set is lower hemicon-
tinuous. If it is, then the maximum theorem can be applied to show that the argmax is
11The game is analyzed in Appendix S2 of the Supplemental Material, available in a supplementary file
on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/2762/supplement.pdf.
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a continuous correspondence.12 However, neither the Nash nor the correlated equilib-
rium correspondence used as a constraint set is lower hemicontinuous and, as we have
seen, the best equilibrium correspondence can then fail to be continuous.13
3. Collusion constrained equilibrium
3.1 The environment
We now introduce our formal model of collusive groups that pursue their own inter-
est subject to within-group individual incentive constraints. The membership in these
groups is exogenously given and the ability of a group to collude is independent of ac-
tions taken by players outside of the group. We emphasize that we use the word “collu-
sion” in the limited meaning that the group can choose a within-group equilibrium to
its liking. The goals of the group—like those of individuals—are exogenously specified:
we do not consider the possibility of conflict within the group over goals.
Our basic setting is that of a standard normal form game. There are players
i = 12     I; player i chooses actions from a finite set ai ∈ Ai and receives utility
ui(ai a−i). On top of this standard normal form game, we have the structure of groups
k = 12    K. There is a fixed assignment of players to groups i → k(i). Notice that
each player is assigned to exactly one group and that the assignment is fixed and exoge-
nous. We use ak ∈ Ak to denote (pure) profiles of actions within group k and use a to
denote the profile of actions over all players. Like individuals, groups have well defined
objectives given by a payoff function vk(aka−k).14
We assume that groups can make plans independently from other groups. We take
this to mean that each group k has an independent group randomizing device, the re-
alization of which is known to all group members but not to players who are not group
members. One implication of this is that the play of group k appears from the perspec-
tive of other groups to be a correlated strategy: a probability distribution ρk ∈ Rk over
pure action profiles Ak. In addition to the group randomizing device, the individual
players in a group can randomize, so that by using the group randomizing device, the
group can randomly choose a profile of mixed strategies for group members. We let
αk ∈ Ak represent such a profile, albeit we take Ak ⊆ Rk so that rather than regarding
αk as a profile of mixed strategies, we choose to regard it as the generated distribution
over pure strategy profiles Ak. Formally if αi denotes probability distributions over Ai,
then αk[ak] ≡∏k(i)=k αi[ai]. If the group mixes over a subset Bk ⊆ Ak using the group
randomizing device, the result is in the convex hull of Bk, which we write as H(Bk).
12This is the approach used by Myerson (1982) to prove the existence of quasi-equilibrium.
13A specific scenario in which the discontinuity and the nonexistence problem goes away requires all
players belonging to the same group to have identical ordinal preferences over all outcomes.
14Notice that we are not restricting the group objective function. Depending on the application,
some group objectives might be more natural than others. For example, we might have vk(aka−k) =∑
i|k(i)=k βiui(aka−k) for some positive utility weights βi > 0. This implies, on the one hand, a preference
for Pareto efficient plans, but also agreement on the welfare weights. In the special case of a group with
just one individual, such a group objective function might be especially compelling. On the other hand,
considerations of fairness might cause a group of more than one individual to prefer a Pareto inferior plan.
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Players choose deviations di ∈ Di = Ai ∪ {0}, where the deviation di = 0 means mix
according to the group plan.15 Individual utility functions then give rise to a function
Ui
(
diαka−k
)=
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑
ak
ui
(
aiak−i a−k
)
αk
[
ak
]
 di = 0
∑
ak
ui
(
diak−i a−k
)
αk
[
ak
]
 di 	= 0
It is convenient also to have a function that summarizes the degree of incentive incom-
patibility of a group plan. Noting that the randomizations of groups are independent of
one another, for αk ∈Ak, ρ−k ∈R−k, we define
Gk
(
αkρ−k
)= max
i|k(i)=kdi∈Di
∑
a−k
(
Ui
(
diαka−k
)−Ui(0αka−k))∏
j 	=k
ρj
[
aj
]≥ 0
which represents the greatest expected gain to any member of group k from deviating
from the plan αk given the play of the other groups. The condition for group incentive
compatibility is simply Gk(αkρ−k)= 0.
The key properties of the model are embodied in Gk(αkρ−k) and
vk
(
αkρ−k
)=∑
a
vk
(
aka−k
)
αk
[
ak
]∏
j 	=k
ρj
[
aj
]

Both functions are continuous in (αkρ−k) and it follows from the standard existence
theorem for Nash equilibrium in finite games that for every ρ−k, there exists an αk such
that Gk(αkρ−k)= 0. These properties together with Ak being a closed subset of Rk are
the only properties that are used in the remainder of the paper.16 For example, we might
wish to allow groups to choose among within-group correlated equilibria rather than
within-group Nash equilibria. In this case, we can take Ak to be all correlated strategies
by group k.17 Alternatively, if we thought that a homogeneous group might be restricted
to anonymous play, we can takeAk to be the mixed strategy of a representative individ-
ual.
We are now in a position to give a comparison of our setup with that of Myerson
(1982). Myerson adds to the model a finite set of types for each player. This in itself
15Note that since we are dealing here with ordinary mixed strategies, there is no need to consider devia-
tions conditional on the outcome of the individual randomizing device. See also footnote 17
16It would not in general be appropriate to assume Ak convex for the following reason. We want public
randomizations over incentive compatible plays. But a distribution over profiles that is a correlated equi-
librium (hence incentive compatible) with respect to some correlating device is not necessarily generated
by public randomization over incentive compatible profiles. For example, a group that has no correlating
devices available except public randomization cannot achieve the usual (1/31/31/3) correlated equilib-
rium in the game of chicken without violating incentive compatibility, because that distribution is obtain-
able only through the public randomization that puts weight 1/3 on the three pure strategy profiles, which
are not all incentive compatible. However, a convex Ak containing the pure profiles would also contain
(1/31/31/3). We must thus dispense with a convexity assumption onAk to properly account for incentive
compatibility within groups.
17In this case we must broaden the definition of a deviation to be a contingent deviation, di : Ai → Ai ,
reflecting a choice of how to play contingent on a particular recommendation.
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does not change anything: our actions can easily be the finite set of maps from types
to individual decisions. However, Myerson’s types are reported to a group coordinator
(the principal) who can then make recommendations to individual group members. We
do not allow this so that our model corresponds to Myerson’s model where there is a
single type of each group member. In this sense, our model is a specialization of Myer-
son. However, because the principal can make private recommendations, in Myerson
the space Ak = Rk is the space of all correlated strategies for the group. As indicated,
our model is consistent with this possibility but it is not our base model and we do not
require this. In the setting of groups rather than agents organized by principals, it is not
particularly natural to allow such a broad set of group strategies; neither is it particu-
larly natural in the applied game settings described in the Introduction. For example,
if the groups are groups of voters, it makes sense that they might coordinate their play
by communicating a degree of enthusiasm for voting that day (randomizing as a group),
but less sense that they would communicate their individual difficulty of voting that day
to a central coordinator who would then make individualized voting recommendations.
The bottom line of this comparison is that our model in whichAk =Rk (and the ap-
propriate set of deviations are used; see footnote 17) coincides with the Myerson model
in which there is a single type. As we indicate below, in this case, his notion of quasi-
equilibrium is exactly our definition of collusion constrained equilibrium.
3.2 Equilibrium
We first give a formal definition of the notion of strict collusion constrained equilibrium.
As we have already shown that these may not exist, we then go on to consider collusion
constrained equilibrium.
Recall that Gk(αkρ−k) measures the greatest gain in utility to any group member of
deviating from the plan αk. The greatest incentive compatible group utility is given by
V k
(
ρ−k
)= max
αk∈Ak|Gk(αkρ−k)=0
vk
(
αkρ−k
)

For the solutions to the maximization problem, we state the following two definitions.
Definition 1. The group best response set Bk(ρ−k) is the set of plans αk satisfying
Gk(αkρ−k)= 0 and vk(αkρ−k)= V k(ρ−k).
Note that Bk(ρ−k) is closed.
Definition 2. The correlated profile ρ ∈R is a strict collusion constrained equilibrium
if ρk ∈H[Bk(ρ−k)] for all k.
As these may not exist, we now give our definition of collusion constrained equi-
librium. We adopt the motivation given in Myerson (1982) for his notion of quasi-
equilibrium.18 Recall that in the proposed collusion constrained equilibrium of our
18As indicated above in the case where the two models coincide, the definition of quasi-equilibrium and
collusion constrained equilibrium coincide as well.
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example, the third player was randomizing 50–50 and that as a consequence it was a
within-group equilibrium for the group to either both cooperate or both defect. How-
ever, cooperation is not a safe option in the sense that a small perturbation in beliefs can
cause it to fail to be incentive compatible. Hence group members might be concerned
that after an agreement is reached, some small change in beliefs would lead members to
violate the agreement. Alternatively, defection is safe in the sense that if such an agree-
ment is reached, no small change in beliefs would lead any group member to wish to
violate the agreement. Let us first define the -worst best utility for group k for beliefs
near ρ−k as
V k
(
ρ−k
)= inf
|σ−k−ρ−k|<
V k
(
σ−k
)

Observe that this is nonincreasing in , so we may take the limit and define V kS (ρ
−k) =
lim→0 V k (ρ−k) as the group safety utility. Our basic premise is that there would be no
reason for the group to choose a plan that gives less group utility than the group safety
utility. For incentive compatible plans yielding higher utility, we are agnostic: perhaps
the group can reach agreement on such plans, perhaps not. This leads us to the next
definition.
Definition 3. The shadow19 response set BkS(ρ
−k) is the set of plans αk that satisfy
Gk(αkρ−k)= 0 and vk(αkρ−k)≥ V kS (ρ−k).
Like Bk(ρ−k), we have BkS(ρ
−k) closed. Note that since V kS (ρ
−k)≤ V k(ρ−k), we have
BkS(ρ
−k) ⊇ Bk(ρ−k). We know from Example 1 that Bk(ρ−k) may fail to be upper hemi-
continuous since a sequence of incentive compatible best plans may converge to a plan
that is not best. We show in the Appendix that by contrast the correspondence BkS(ρ
−k)
must be upper hemicontinuous. The key intuition is that the group safety level V kS (ρ
−k)
can jump down but not up so that a sequence of safe plans converges to a safe plan.20
Because BkS(ρ
−k) is upper hemicontinuous, BkS(ρ
−k) = Bk(ρ−k) implies that Bk(ρ−k) is
also upper hemicontinuous at ρ−k and we say that ρ−k is a regular point for group k.
Otherwise we say that ρ−k is a critical point for group k.
Our premise is that the group will place weight only on incentive compatible plans
that provide at least the group safety utility, that is, onBkS(ρ
−k), so we adopt the following
definition.
Definition 4. The correlated profile ρ ∈R is a collusion constrained equilibrium if ρk ∈
H[BkS(ρ−k)] for all k.
The key to collusion constrained equilibrium is that we allow plans in BkS(ρ
−k) not
merely in Bk(ρ−k). In a collusion constrained equilibrium, if ρk /∈ H[Bk(ρ−k)], we say
19The set BkS (ρ
−k) is a kind of shadow of nearby best within-group equilibria.
20Basically this solves the problem of discontinuity by forcing Reny’s (1999) better reply security con-
dition. Bich and Laraki (2017) demonstration that Reny solutions are Nash is similar to the fact here that
when the shadow best response set is the same as the group best response set, then collusion constrained
equilibria are strict collusion constrained equilibria.
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that group k engages in shadowmixing. This means that the group puts positive proba-
bility on within-group equilibria in BkS(ρ
−k) \Bk(ρ−k) that are not the best possible.
Our example above shows that shadow mixing may be necessary in equilibrium, as
we spell out next.
Example (Example 1 revisited). In the example, we take k(1) = k(2) = 1 and k(3) = 2.
In this and all subsequent use of this example, we take group utility to be defined by
equal welfare weights on individual utility functions v1(a1 a2)= u1(a1 a2)+ u2(a1 a2)
and v2(a1 a2)= u3(a1 a2).
To apply the definition of collusion constrained equilibrium, we first compute for
group k= 1 the best utility V 1(ρ2), where, since there is one player, ρ2 may be identified
with α3. For α3 ≤ 1/2, we know that the best within-group equilibrium for group k = 1
is CC with corresponding group utility V 1(ρ2)= 12+ 8(1− α3), while for α3 > 1/2, the
only within-group equilibrium is DD with group utility V 1(ρ2) = 4. For α3 	= 1/2, we
have V 1S (ρ
2) = V 1(ρ2), and the shadow response and best response sets are the same:
CC for α3 < 1/2 and DD for α3 > 1/2. At α3 = 1/2, the worst best utility for nearby
beliefs is that for α3 > 1/2, giving a group utility of 4, whence the set of incentive com-
patible plans that give at least this utility are the within-group equilibria CC and DD;
that is, B1S(ρ
2) = {(CC) (DD)}. For the group k = 2 consisting solely of individual 3,
the shadow response set is just the usual best response set.
Clearly there is no equilibrium with α3 	= 1/2. Alternatively, when α3 = 1/2, the group
can shadow-mix 50–50 between CC and DD, leaving player 3 indifferent between C
and D; so this is a collusion constrained equilibrium. We conclude that there is a unique
collusion constrained equilibrium with ρ1 a 50–50 mixture over {(CC) (DD)} and ρ2
a 50–50 mixture over {CD}. ♦
As the example shows, collusion constrained equilibrium may require that the group
sometimes agree to plans that are “unsafe.” Whether this makes sense is not clear: one
of our main tasks in the remainder of the paper is to establish whether it does indeed
make sense.
It should be apparent that collusion constrained equilibria use as correlating devices
only the private randomization device available to each player and the group random-
ization device. We refer to correlated equilibria of the underlying game that use only
these randomizing devices as group correlated equilibria.21 Formally, let Bk(ρ−k) be
the set of plans αk satisfying Gk(αkρ−k) = 0. Then a group correlated equilibrium is a
ρ ∈R such that ρk ∈H[Bk(ρ−k)] for all k.
Theorem 1. Collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a subset of the group corre-
lated equilibria of the underlying game.
21These types of equilibria as well as others where groups have more sophisticated correlating devices
for internal use have been investigated in the context of voting models by Pogorelskiy (2014).
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The theorem is proved in the Appendix.22 It makes clear the sense in which collusion
constrained equilibria are constrained: there are many group correlated equilibria, but
those that are interesting from the point of view of collusion are those in which groups
are constrained to play in their shadow response sets.
4. Three model perturbations
We now study how collusion constrained equilibrium arises as a limit of equilibria in
perturbed models. The key point is that equilibria in the perturbed models will be strict:
groups make best choices and there is no shadow mixing. There is no issue of the group
sometimes sacrificing utility for safety and sometimes not. Neither is there an issue of
existence: in each case, strict equilibria are shown to exist.
We consider three different types of perturbations. First, based loosely on the ear-
lier discussions of perturbations of beliefs and safety, we consider the possibility that
group beliefs are random. Second, we consider the possibility that incentive constraints
can be overcome by a costly enforcement technology. Finally, we suppose that group
decisions are taken by a leader who has valence in the sense of being able to persuade
group members to do as he wishes, but that if he issues orders that are not followed,
he is punished. In each case, we take a limit: as beliefs become less random, enforce-
ment becomes more costly or valence shrinks, and in each case, we show that the limit
of equilibria of the perturbed games are collusion constrained equilibria in the unper-
turbed game. We emphasize that these are upper hemicontinuity results that do not
show that every collusion constrained equilibrium arises this way. The issue of lower
hemicontinuity is considered subsequently.
4.1 Random belief equilibrium
We now show that collusion constrained equilibria are limit points of strict collusion
constrained equilibria when beliefs of each group about behavior of the other groups
are random and the randomness tends to vanish. We start by describing a random be-
lief model. The idea is that given the true play ρ−k of the other groups, there is a com-
mon belief σ−k by group k that is a random function of that true play. Notice that these
random beliefs are shared by the entire group; we could also consider individual belief
perturbations, but it is the common component that is of interest to us, because it is
this that coordinates group play. Conceptually if we think that a group colludes through
some sort of discussions that gives rise to common knowledge (looking each other in the
eye, a handshake, and so forth), then it makes sense that during these discussions a con-
sensus emerges not just on what action to take, but underlying that choice, a consensus
on what the other groups are thought to be doing. We must emphasize tat our model
is a model of the consequences of groups successfully colluding: we do not attempt
to model the underlying processes of communication, negotiation, and consensus that
lead to their successful collusion.
22Despite the close relationship, the existence of collusion constrained equilibrium does not follow from
the existence of quasi-equilibrium in Myerson (1982); neither can we use his argument since he assumes
that principals have finitely many choices, while our groups choose from a continuum.
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Figure 1. Beliefs equilibrium.
Definition 5. A density function fk(σ−k|ρ−k) is called a random group belief model
if it is continuous as a function of (σ−kρ−k); for  > 0, we say that the random group
belief model is only -wrong if it satisfies
∫
|σ−k−ρ−k|≤ f
k(σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k ≥ 1− .
In other words, if the model is only -wrong, then it places a low probability on being
far from the truth. In Appendix S1, we give, for every positive , an example based on the
Dirichlet distribution of a random group belief model that is only -wrong.
Definition 6. A group decision rule is a function bk(ρ−k) ∈H[Bk(ρ−k)], measurable as
a function of ρ−k.
Notice that for given beliefs ρ−k, we are assuming that the group colludes on a re-
sponse in Bk(ρ−k), which is the set of the best choices for the group that satisfy the
incentive constraints, and does not choose points in BkS(ρ
−k) \ Bk(ρ−k) as would be
permitted by shadow mixing.
Definition 7. For a group decision rule bk and random group belief model f k,
the group response function is the distribution Fk(ρ−k)[ak] = ∫ bk(σ−k)[ak]fk(σ−k|
ρ−k)dσ−k. If we have rules and belief models for all groups, then a ρ ∈ R that satisfies
ρk = Fk(ρ−k) for all k is called a random belief equilibrium with respect to bk and fk.
In the Appendix the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 2. For each k, n, and n, given group decision rules bk and randomgroup belief
models fkn that are only n-wrong, there are random belief equilibria ρn with respect to b
k
and fkn . Moreover, if n → 0 and ρn → ρ, then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Example (Random belief equilibrium in Example 1). In Appendix S2, we analyze
the random belief model corresponding to the Dirichlet belief model defined in Ap-
pendix S1. Figure 1 shows what the group response functions look like in our three-
player example. The key point is that the random belief equilibrium value of α3 lies
below 1/2, that is, as  → 0, the collusion constrained equilibrium is approached from
the left and above. ♦
322 Dutta, Levine, and Modica Theoretical Economics 13 (2018)
4.2 Costly enforcement equilibrium
We now assume that each group k has a costly enforcement technology that it can use to
overcome incentive constraints. In particular, we assume that every plan αk is incentive
compatible provided that the group pays a cost C(αkρ−k) of carrying out the moni-
toring and punishment needed to prevent deviation. Levine and Modica (2016) show
how costs of this type arise from peer discipline systems and Levine and Mattozzi (2016)
study these systems in the context of voting by collusive parties: we give an example
below. We assume Ck(αkρ−k) to be nonnegative and continuous in αk, ρ−k and adopt
the following definition.
Definition 8. A function Ck(αkρ−k) is an enforcement cost if Ck(αkρ−k) = 0 when-
ever Gk(αkρ−k)= 0.
In other words, enforcement is costly only if there is a deviation that needs to be
deterred. Moreover, since nearby plans have similar gains to deviating, we assume also
that the cost of deterring those deviations is similar, that is, we assume that enforce-
ment costs are continuous. A particular example of such a cost function is Ck(αkρ−k)=
Gk(αkρ−k), that is, the cost of deterring a deviation is proportional to the biggest ben-
efit any player receives by deviating. We give below an alternative example based on a
technology for monitoring deviations. Notice that we allow the possibility that incentive
incompatible plans have zero cost.
With this technology, we state the following definition.
Definition 9. The enforced group best response set BkC(ρ
−k) is the set of plans αk such
that vk(αkρ−k)−Ck(αkρ−k)=maxα˜k∈Ak vk(α˜kρ−k)−Ck(α˜kρ−k).
Notice that again there is no shadow mixing here, just a choice of the group’s best
plan. Then we have the following usual definition of equilibrium.
Definition 10. The correlated profile ρ ∈ R is a costly enforcement equilibrium if ρk ∈
H[BkC(ρ−k)].
Notice that if the cost of enforcement is zero, then the group can achieve the best
outcome ignoring incentive constraints, an assumption, as we indicated in the Intro-
duction, often used by political economists and economic historians. We are interested
in the opposite case in which enforcing non-incentive compatible plans is very costly.
Definition 11. A sequence Ckn (α
kρ−k) of cost functions is high cost if there are se-
quences γkn → 0 and 
kn → ∞ such that Gk(αkρ−k) > γkn implies Ckn (αkρ−k)≥ 
kn .
In the Appendix, we prove23 the following theorem.
23Actually it is not essential that 
kn → ∞, just that it be “big enough” that it would never be worth paying
such a high cost.
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Theorem 3. Suppose Ckn (α
kρ−k) is a high cost sequence. Then for each n, a costly en-
forcement equilibrium ρn exists, and if limn→∞ ρn → ρ, then ρ is a collusion constrained
equilibrium.
Example 2. We give a simple example of a costly enforcement technology and a high
cost sequence based on Levine and Modica (2016). Specifically, we view the choice of αk
by group k as a social norm and assume that the group has a monitoring technology that
generates a noisy signal of whether an individual member i complies with the norm. The
signal is zi ∈ {01}, where 0 means “good, followed the social norm” and 1 means “bad,
did not follow the social norm.” Suppose further that if member i violates the social
norm by choosing αi 	= αk, then the signal is 1 for sure, while if he adhered to the social
norm so that αi = αk, then the signal is 1 with probability πn. When the bad signal is
received, the group member receives a punishment of size Pi.24
It is convenient to define the individual version of the gain to deviating:
Gi
(
αkρ−k
)= max
di∈Di
∑
a−k
(
Ui
(
diαka−k
)−Ui(0αka−k))∏
j 	=k
ρj
[
aj
]≥ 0
For the social norm αk to be incentive compatible, we need Pi − πnPi ≥ Gi(αkρ−k),
which is to say Pi ≥Gi(αkρ−k)/(1−πn). If the social norm is adhered to, the social cost
of the punishment is πnPi, and the group will collude to minimize this cost so that it will
choose Pi = Gi(αkρ−k)/(1 − πn). The resulting cost is then (πn/(1 − πn))Gi(αkρ−k).
Hence in this model, Ckn (α
kρ−k)= (πn/(1−πn))∑k(i)=kGi(αkρ−k).
Since Ckn (α
kρ−k) = 0 if and only if Gk(αkρ−k) = maxi|k(i)=kGi(αkρ−k) = 0, it fol-
lows that Ckn (α
kρ−k) is an enforcement cost. We claim that as πn → 1, that is, as the
signal quality deteriorates, this is in fact a high cost sequence. Certainly Ckn (α
kρ−k) ≥
(πn/(1 − πn))Gk(αkρ−k). Choose γkn → 0 such that 
kn ≡ (πn/(1 − πn))γkn → ∞. Then
for Gk(αkρ−k) > γkn , we have Ckn (αkρ−k)≥ 
kn as required by the definition. ♦
Example (Costly enforcement equilibrium in Example 1). We use the high cost se-
quence just defined. In Appendix S2, we show that the costly enforcement equilibrium
of our three-player game consists of the group randomizing 50–50 between CC and DD
while player 3 plays α3 = (4 − 3πn)/2 for all πn > 4/5. This equilibrium converges to
the collusion constrained equilibrium as πn → 1. Notice that the collusion constrained
equilibrium value of α3 = 1/2 is approached from the right while the group randomiza-
tion in the costly enforcement equilibrium is constant and equal to the limiting con-
strained equilibrium value. This is the opposite of what we have seen in the random
belief model where the approach is from the left and above. ♦
4.3 Leader/evaluator equilibrium
In this section we tackle collusion constrained equilibrium from the perspective of the
Nash program, showing how this partially cooperative notion arises from a limit of stan-
24Here the coercion takes the form of punishment, but it could equally well be the withholding of a
reward.
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dard noncooperative games. We do so by introducing leaders. Leaders give their follow-
ers instructions: they tell them things such as “let’s go on strike” or “let’s vote against
that candidate.” The idea is that group leaders serve as explicit coordinating devices
for groups. Each group will have a leader who tells group members what to do, and if
he is to serve as an effective coordinating device, these instructions cannot be optional.
However, we do not want leaders to issue instructions that members do not wish to fol-
low, that is, that are not incentive compatible. Hence we give them incentives to issue
instructions that are incentive compatible by allowing group members to “punish” their
leader. Indeed, we do observe in practice that it is often the case that groups follow
orders given by a leader but engage in ex post evaluation of the leader’s performance.
The leader/evaluator game is governed by two positive parameters ν and P . The pa-
rameter ν measures the “valence” of a leader: this has a concrete interpretation as the
amount of utility that group members are ready to give up to follow the leader.25 Alter-
natively, ν can be thought of as measuring group loyalty. The parameter P represents a
punishment that can be levied by a group member against the leader.26 Provided P is
large enough, we show that when valence tends to zero, the limits of perfect Bayesian
equilibria of the leader/evaluator game are collusion constrained equilibria of the orig-
inal game.
Our noncooperative game goes as follows.
Stage 1. Each leader chooses a plan αk ∈Ak that is communicated only to members
of group k: conceptually these are orders given to the members who must obey them.
Stage 2. Each player i with k(i)= k serves as an evaluator and, observing the plan αk
of the leader, selects an element di ∈Ak ∪ {0}.
Payoffs. Let Qk denote the number of evaluators who chose di 	= 0. The leader
receives vk(αkα−k) − PQk, that is, for each evaluator who disagrees with his deci-
sion, he is penalized by P . The evaluator receives utility Ui(diαkα−k) if di 	= 0 and
Ui(0αkα−k)+ ν if di = 0, that is, he takes as given that the other players in the group
have followed orders and gets a bonus of ν if he agrees with the leader’s decision.
Note that the leader and evaluator do not learn what the other groups did until the
game is over. In interpreting this game it is important to realize that the actions taken
by group members are those ordered by the leader: the choices they make as evaluators
are simply statements of regret. So, for example, if the leader recommended a mixed
strategy, mix 50–50 between C and D, the choice di = 0 is a statement by the evaluator
of satisfaction with that recommendation and the choice di = C is a statement of dis-
satisfaction, i.e., the evaluator regrets not having chosen C. If the plan of the leader is
regretted, the evaluator then imposes a punishment on the leader.
Definition 12. We say that ρ is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the leader/evaluator
game if for each leader k, there is a mixed plan μk over Ak, and for each evaluator i in
25It is convenient notationally and for the statement of results that all leaders have the same valence;
this also implicitly assumes that followers of a leader are equally willing to sacrifice. This entails no loss of
generality since as long as the willingness to sacrifice is positive, we can linearly rescale ui to units in which
willingness to sacrifice is the same.
26Again this might depend on k, but we can rescale νk so that punishment is the same for all leaders.
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each group k and each plan αk, there is a mixed action ηi(αk) over Ak ∪ {0}, measurable
as a function of αk, such that the following statements hold:
(i) We have ρk = ∫ σkμk(dσk).
(ii) The plan μk (that is to say ρk) is optimal for the leader given ρ−k and ηi.
(iii) For all αk ∈Ak and evaluators i, the measure ηi(αk) is optimal for the evaluator
given αk and ρ−k.
Note that (iii) embodies the idea of “not signaling what you do not know”27 that
beliefs about the play of leaders of other groups is independent of the plan chosen by the
leader of the own group.28 Note that we have not explicitly defined a system of beliefs,
since the not signaling what you do not know condition makes the beliefs of evaluators
over α−k constant across all their information sets.
For this game to have an interesting relation to collusion constrained equilibrium,
two things should be true.
• The evaluators must be able to punish the leader enough to prevent him from
choosing incentive incompatible plans. A sufficient condition is that the punish-
ment is greater than any possible gain in the game, that is, P >maxvk(αkα−k)−
minvk(αkα−k).
• The leader should be able to avoid punishment by choosing an incentive com-
patible plan. However, the leader can only guarantee avoiding punishment if the
evaluators strictly prefer not to deviate from his plan. If ν = 0, this is true only for
plans that are strictly incentive compatible and such plans may not exist. Hence
the assumption ν > 0 is crucial: it assures that the leader can always avoid punish-
ment by choosing an incentive compatible plan.
The following result is proved in the Appendix.
Theorem 4. Suppose νn → 0 and Pn > maxvk(αkα−k) − minvk(αkα−k). Then for
each n, a perfect Bayesian equilibrium ρn of the leader/evaluator game exists, and if
limn→∞ ρn = ρ, then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Example (Leader/evaluator equilibrium in Example 1). For α3 < 1/2, playing CC is in-
centive compatible for the group. The question is how much can they mix out of the
unique bad within-group equilibrium DD when α3 > 1/2 given that they are willing to
forgo gains no larger than ν. Appendix S2 shows that the equilibrium is αˆ3 = (2+ ν)/4>
27It is known for finite games that this is an implication of sequentiality, and Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)
use this condition to define perfect Bayesian equilibrium for a class of games. Since the leader/evaluator
game is not finite, sequentiality is complicated. Hence it seems most straightforward to follow Fudenberg
and Tirole (1991) and define perfect Bayesian directly with the not signaling what you do not know condi-
tion.
28Since the leader has no way of knowing if other leaders have deviated, he should not be able to signal
this through his own choice of action.
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1/2 and that the group mixes between the unique mixture αˆ1 = αˆ2 that is the smallest
solution of −4(αˆ1)2(1− αˆ3)+ 2αˆ1 = ν and CC with probability
05− (αˆ1)2
1− (αˆ1)2
on CC. Note that as ν → 0, we have αˆ1 → 0, so that in the limit the group shadow mixes
between CC and DD as expected. Notice also that α3 > 1/2 so that the solution is on
“the same side” of 1/2 as the costly enforcement equilibrium, but the opposite side of
the belief equilibrium. The solution differs from both, however, in that the group does
not randomize between CC and DD, but rather between CC and a mixed strategy. ♦
5. Limits of perturbations
In the perturbations we have considered the result is always that the limit of the per-
turbation is a collusion constrained equilibria. If there are several such equilibria, do
the different limits converge to the same equilibrium? Not always. In this section, we
present an example with a continuum of collusion constrained equilibria and in which
different perturbations pick different points out of this set.
The example is a variation of Example 1, where player 3 gets zero for sure if he
plays C, and the good within-group equilibrium in the coordination game for the group
that results if player 3 plays D is only weakly incentive compatible. We continue to set
v1(a1 a2)= u1(a1 a2)+ u2(a1 a2) and v2(a1 a2)= u3(a1 a2).
Example 3. The matrix on the left below contains the payoffs if player 3 plays C; the
right matrix results if she plays D:
C D
C 660 080
D 800 220
C D
C 880 085
D 805 225
In this game, clearly player 3 must play D with probability 1: if he plays C with any pos-
itive probability, then it is strictly dominant for players 1 and 2 to play D, in which case
player 3 strictly prefers to play D. When player 3 plays D, players 1 and 2 have exactly
two within-group equilibria, CC and DD, and any mixture between them is a collusion
constrained equilibrium. To see this, observe that for any belief perturbation around
α3 = 0, the worst within-group equilibrium for the group is always DD, so V 1S (α3 = 0)
is the utility the group obtains in that within-group equilibrium. Thus any mixture be-
tween DD and CC satisfies the equilibrium condition, where of course in all strictly
mixed equilibria, the group gets utility higher than V 1S .
Now consider the perturbations. For any random beliefs, C has positive probability
so the group must play DD, so the only limit of random belief equilibria is DD. For costly
enforcement equilibrium, alternatively, the better within-group equilibrium CC for the
group has zero cost, so that will be chosen: the unique limit in this case is CC. Finally,
for leadership equilibrium, since the compliance bonus ν is positive, again CC will be
Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) Collusion constrained equilibrium 327
chosen: the unique limit is again CC. Notice that not only do the different perturbations
sometimes pick different points out of the collusion constrained equilibrium (CCE) set,
but the collusion constrained equilibria involving strict mixtures do not arise as a limit
from any of the perturbed models. ♦
This example is nongeneric because it depends heavily on the fact that when player
3 plays a pure strategy D, players 1 and 2 are indifferent to deviating from CC. If we try
to construct an example of this type in the interior, then players 1 and 2 must shadow
mix in the correct way to make player 3 indifferent and this should pin down what the
shadow mixture must be. In the example, we get around this by assuming that the pure
strategy for player 3 is a strict best response so that there is a continuum of shadow
mixtures by 1 and 2 that are consistent with player 3 playing D.29
6. Lower hemicontinuity and a characterization of CCE
Roughly speaking, when we consider a perturbation such as random belief equilibrium,
leadership equilibrium, or costly enforcement equilibrium, we are exhibiting a degree
of agnosticism about the model we have written down. That is, we recognize that our
model is an imperfect representation but hopefully reasonable approximation of a more
complex reality and ask whether our equilibrium might be a good description of what
happens in that more complex reality. This is the spirit behind refinements such as trem-
bling hand perfection and concepts such as Harsanyi’s (1973) notion of purification of
a mixed equilibrium. It is the question addressed by Fudenberg et al. (1988), who show
how refinements do not capture the equilibria of all nearby games. We have shown that
collusion constrained equilibrium does a good job of capturing random beliefs, costly
enforcement, and leadership equilibria. We know by example that there may be col-
lusion constrained equilibria that do not arise as a limit of any of these. We now ask
whether, for a given collusion constrained equilibrium, there is a story we can tell in the
form of a perturbation representing a more complex reality that justifies the particular
collusion constrained equilibrium.
Each of the perturbations we have considered has embodied a story or justification
about why groups might be playing the way they are playing. We now consider a richer
class of perturbations that combines elements of beliefs with costly enforcement and a
perturbation of the group objective function. Specifically, we use the following defini-
tion.
Definition 13. A perturbation for each group k consists of a continuous belief per-
turbation r−kk (ρ
−k) ∈R−k, an enforcement cost function Ck(αkρ−k), and a continuous
objective function wk(αkρ−k). A perturbed equilibrium ρ is defined by the condition
ρk ∈H[argmaxαk wk(αk r−kk (ρ−k))−Ck(αk r−kk (ρ−k))].
29We do not know if generic examples exist: genericity is quite difficult to analyze in this model. That our
results on lower hemicontinuity in the next section make use of perturbations of the group utility function
suggests that examples in which the limits fail to coincide may well be nongeneric.
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The belief perturbation is a simplification of the random belief model that assumed
that beliefs were random but near correct most of the time. Now we are going to assume
that they are deterministic and near correct. As in the random belief model, we allow
that beliefs are slightly wrong and do not require that two groups agree about the play of
a third. The model of costly enforcement is exactly the same model we studied earlier.
In addition, we are now agnostic about the group objective and allow the possibility that
the model may be slightly wrong in this respect. From a technical point of view it helps
get rid of nongeneric examples. As we are only interested in small perturbations, we
state the following definition.
Definition 14. A sequence of perturbations r−kkn , C
k
n , w
k
n is said to converge as n→ ∞ if
maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k)−ρ−k| → 0, ifCkn is a high cost sequence, and if maxαkρ−k |wkn(αkρ−k)−
vk(αkρ−k)| → 0. We say that ρ is justifiable if there is a convergent sequence of pertur-
bations together with perturbed equilibria ρn → ρ.
Our main result, proven in the Appendix, follows.
Theorem 5. A perturbed equilibrium exists for any perturbation, and ρ is justifiable if
and only if it is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
7. A voting participation game
What difference do groups make? Collusion constrained equilibria are a subset of the set
of group correlated equilibria, so we should expect that often the equilibria that are re-
jected are going to have better efficiency properties than those that are accepted. How-
ever, that comparison is not so interesting because it is the fact that the group is collusive
that enables it to randomize privately from the other groups, that is, to coordinate their
play.30 A more useful comparison is to ask what happens if the players play as individu-
als without correlating devices to coordinate their play versus what happens if they are
in collusive groups. So, in addition to static Nash equilibrium, a second useful bench-
mark is to analyze the case in which there is free (costless) enforcement equilibrium
(FEE), so that incentive constraints do not matter.
Our setting for studying the economics of collusion is a voter participation game. We
start with a relatively standard Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985) framework (see also Levine
and Mattozzi 2016). There are two parties: the “large” party has two voters, players 1 and
2; the “small” party has one voter, player 3. Voters always vote for their own party, but is
is costly to vote—a cost we normalize to 1—and voters may choose whether to vote. The
party that wins receives a transfer payment of 2τ > 0 from the losing party: if the large
party wins, player 3 loses 2τ, which the large party members split; if player 3 wins, she
gets τ from each member of the large party. Usually it is assumed that a tie means that
each party has a 50–50 chance of winning the prize, meaning that the election is a wash
and no transfer payment is made. In case nobody votes, we maintain this assumption
30The random belief model, in particular, only makes sense if the group is colluding; otherwise how can
they agree on their beliefs?
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that the status quo is unchanged and everyone gets 0. But when voting does take place
it is often not the case in practice that a tie is innocuous: it may result in a deadlocked
government or in conflict between the parties. So we assume that a tie where each party
casts one vote results in a deadlock that is, for simplicity, just as bad as a loss. The group
objective of either party is to maximize the sum of payoffs of its members.
The payoffs can be written in bi-matrix form. If player 3 does not vote, the payoff
matrix for the actions of players 1 and 2 (where 0 represents do not vote and 1 represents
vote) is
1 0
1 τ− 1 τ− 1−2τ τ− 1 τ−2τ
0 ττ− 1−2τ 000
This game between players 1 and 2 has a unique dominant strategy equilibrium at which
neither votes if τ < 1. If player 3 does vote, the payoff matrix for the actions of players 1
and 2 becomes
1 0
1 τ− 1 τ− 1−2τ− 1 −τ− 1−τ−2τ− 1
0 −τ−τ− 1−2τ− 1 −τ−τ2τ − 1
If τ > 1/2, this is a coordination game for players 1 and 2 due to the fact that a tie is as
bad as a loss: for a large party member not voting and having a tie results in −τ, while
voting and winning results in τ − 1>−τ. Similarly voting and having a tie is as bad as a
loss and it would be better to not vote and lose, suffering the same loss but not paying
the cost of voting.
The model has elements of both external and internal conflict. There is conflict be-
tween the groups as each hopes to get the transfer. There is also conflict within the large
group as each player prefers that the other votes. There are two sources of inefficiency
in the model: total welfare (the sum of the utilities of the all three players) is reduced
if players vote and is further reduced if there is a tie with one player from each group
voting.
The full analysis of the structure of collusion constrained, Nash and free enforce-
ment equilibria in this model can be found in Appendix S3. To appreciate the usefulness
of CCE, focus on the range 3/4 < τ < 1. Here there is a unique Nash equilibrium S in
which only the small group votes and a unique FEE L in which the small group abstains
and the large group wins by casting a single vote. In this range there is also a unique
CCE in which the small group mixes on voting and not voting with positive probability
and the large group shadow mixes between staying out with probability 1/2τ and casting
two votes. In the CCE, the small group does better than FEE and worse than Nash while
the large group does worse than FEE and better than Nash. The CCE more accurately
captures the behavior of a collusive group as one that is in between the Nash prediction
of extreme free riding and the FEE prediction of complete disregard of individual incen-
tives. A more subtle implication relates to the equilibrium behavior of the small party.
Despite consisting of a single player, the CCE aptly captures how equilibrium behavior
depends significantly on whether the player faces an individual or a group, and in the
latter case then whether it is collusive.
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Varying τ provides a richer but similar picture. First note that among all equilibria of
all types, when they are equilibria, S is always best for the small group and L is always
best for the large group. Start with τ < 1/2 in which case nobody votes. As we increase
τ, Nash always allows S, although for τ > 1 there are additional equilibria less favorable
to the small player, including L. CCE and FEE both shift gradually in favor of the large
group, but CCE changes more slowly than does FEE: for FEE, once τ > 3/4 the unique
equilibrium is L, while for CCE, this is true only for τ > 3/2.
8. Conclusion
We study exogenously specified collusive groups and argue that the “right” notion of
equilibrium is that of collusion constrained equilibrium. We start from the observa-
tion that groups such as political, ethnic, business, or religious groups often collude.
We adopt the simple assumption that a group will collude on the within-group equi-
librium that best satisfies group objectives. We find that this seemingly innocuous as-
sumption disrupts the existence of equilibrium in simple games. We show that the ex-
istence problem is due to a discontinuity of the equilibrium set and we propose a “fix”
that builds on the presumption that a group cannot be assumed to be able to play a
particular within-group equilibrium with certainty when, at that within-group equilib-
rium, the incentive constraints are satisfied with equality. This “tremble” implies that
the group may put positive probability on actions that are worse for the group but are
strictly incentive compatible. We show that the resulting equilibrium notion has strong
robustness properties and indeed is both upper and lower hemicontinuous with respect
to a class of perturbations. This makes collusion constrained equilibrium a strong foun-
dation for analyzing exogenous groups (including dynamic models where people flow
between exogenous groups based on economic incentives as in the Acemoglu’s 2001
farm lobby model), which in some sense is the case that Olson (1965) had in mind and
is of key importance in much of the political economy literature. This is not to argue
that endogenous group formation is not of interest, but it is important to understand
what happens as a consequence of group formation before building models of group
formation, and collusion constrained equilibrium is a step in that direction.
Appendix: Continuity, limits, and existence
Lemma 1. Suppose we have a sequence of sets Bkn , correlated profiles ρ
−k
n → ρ−k, scalars
V kn , and positive numbers γ
k
n → 0 satisfying, for any αkn ∈ Bkn ,
(i) Gk(αknρ
−k
n )≤ γkn ,
(ii) vk(αknρ
−k
n )≥ V kn .
If Bk is the set of αk ∈ Bk that satisfies
(a) Gk(αkρ−k)= 0,
(b) vk(αkρ−k)≥ lim infV kn ,
then for any ρkn ∈H(Bkn) with ρkn → ρk it is the case that ρk ∈H(Bk).
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Proof. Since Gk and vk are continuous, the closure of Bkn satisfies the same inequali-
ties, so it suffices to prove the result for closed sets Bkn .
We have ρkn ∈H(Bkn) if and only if there exists a probability measure μkn over Bkn with
ρkn =
∫
σμkn(dσ). Since B
k
n is closed,Ak \Bkn is open and we can extend the measure to all
of Ak by taking μkn[Ak \ Bkn ] = 0. Since Ak is compact, we may extract a weakly conver-
gent subsequence that converges to μk and without loss of generality may assume the
original sequence has this property. Because μkn → μk, it follows from weak convergence
that ρk = ∫ σμk(dσ). The result follows if we can show that μk[Bk] = 1.
Consider the sets Bkv for which v
k(αkρ−k) ≥ lim infV kn and Bk0 for which Gk(αk
ρ−k) = 0. We show that μk[Bkv ] = 1 and μk[Bk0 ] = 1 from which it follows that μk[Bk] =
μk[Bkv ∩Bk0 ] = 1.
For Bkv , let  > 0 and let D
k
v be the set v
k(αkρ−k) < lim infV kn − . For n sufficiently
large, Dkv ∩Bkn =∅, so μkn[Dkv] = 0. However, since vk is continuous, Dkv is an open set,
and if μk[Dkv]> 0, then for all sufficiently large n, we have μkn[Dkv]> 0—a contradiction.
We conclude that for all  > 0, we have μk[Dkv] = 0, so indeed μk[Bkv ] = 1.
For Bk0 let  > 0 and let D
k
0be the set G
k(αkρ−k) > . BecauseAk ×R−k is compact,
Gk(αkρ−k) is uniformly continuous so Gk(·ρ−kn ) converges uniformly to Gk(·ρ−k).
Hence for n sufficiently large, αk ∈ Dk0 implies Gk(αkρ−kn ) > /2 and since γkn → 0
also for sufficiently large n, this implies μkn[Dk0] = 0. However, since Gk is continu-
ous, Dk0 is an open set, and if μ
k[Dk0] > 0, then for all sufficiently large n, we have
μkn[Dk0] > 0—a contradiction. We conclude that for all  > 0, we have μk[Dk0] = 0, so
indeed μk[Bk0 ] = 1. 
Corollary 1. Let the sets Bkn satisfy G
k(αknρ
−k
n ) ≤ γkn and vk(αknρ−kn ) ≥ V kn(ρ−kn ). If
γkn n → 0 and ρkn ∈H(Bkn)→ ρk for all k, then ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Proof. If n ≤ /2 and |ρ−kn − ρ−k| ≤ /2, then |σ−kn − ρ−kn | ≤ n implies |σ−kn − ρ−k| ≤
 whence V kn(ρ
−k
n ) ≥ V k (ρ−k). This gives lim infV kn(ρ−kn ) ≥ V kS (ρ−k). Therefore taking
V kn = V kn(ρ−kn ), Lemma 1 shows that ρk is contained in the convex hull of a set contained
in BkS(ρ
−k) for all k, whence the conclusion. 
Collusion constrained equilibrium
Theorem 1 (restatement). Collusion constrained equilibria exist and are a subset of the
set of group correlated equilibria of the game.
Proof. For any sequence of correlated profiles ρ−kn → ρ−k, let γkn = 0 and let V kn =
V kS (ρ
k
n). Notice that lim infV
k
n ≥ V kS (ρk). Then by Lemma 1 we know that the convex
hull of the shadow response set H(BkS(ρ
−k)) is upper hemicontinuous (UHC). Existence
of collusion constrained equilibria then follows from Kakutani. The fact that collusion
constrained equilibria are group correlated equilibria follows from the fact that the in-
centive constraints are satisfied for each individual given signals generated by the pri-
vate and group randomizing devices. 
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Random belief equilibria
Theorem 2 (restatement). For each k, n, and n, given group decision rules bk and ran-
dom group belief models f kn that are only n-wrong, there are random belief equilibria
ρn with respect to bk and fkn . Moreover, if n → 0 and ρn → ρ, then ρ is a collusion con-
strained equilibrium.
Proof. Remember that ρkn(a
k) = Fk(ρ−k)[ak] = ∫ bk(σ−k)[ak]fkn(σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k,
where fkn(σ
−k|ρ−k) is continuous as a function of ρ−k. So ρkn(ak) is a continuous func-
tion of ρ−k by the dominated convergence theorem, for every ak. Existence then follows
from the Brouwer fixed point theorem.
Turning to convergence, by definition
ρkn =
∫
bk
(
σ−k
)
fkn
(
σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k
=
∫
|σ−k−ρ−k|≤n
bk
(
σ−k
)
fkn
(
σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k
+
∫
|σ−k−ρ−k|>n
bk
(
σ−k
)
fkn
(
σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k
Let ekn(ρ
−k)≡ ∫|σ−k−ρ−k|≤n f kn(σ−k|ρ−k)dσ−k and
ρkn ≡
∫
|σ−k−ρ−k|≤n
bk
(
σ−k
)fkn
(
σ−k|ρ−k)
ekn
(
ρ−k
) dσ−k
Then we may write
ρkn = ekn
(
ρ−k
)
ρkn +
(
1− ekn
(
ρ−k
))∫
|σ−k−ρ−k|>n
bk
(
σ−k
)fkn
(
σ−k|ρ−k)
1− ekn
(
ρ−k
) dσ−k
Now assume n → 0. By assumption ekn(ρ−k) → 1 and ρkn → ρk it follows that ρkn →
ρk. Take then Bkn ≡ {αk ∈ Bk(σ−k)||σ−k − ρ−kn | ≤ n}. Clearly ρkn ∈H(Bkn). We now show
that the sequence (ρknρ
−k
n ) satisfies the hypotheses of Corollary 1. For any α
k
n ∈ Bkn there
is σ−kn with |σ−kn − ρ−kn | ≤ n such that Gk(αknσ−kn ) = 0 and vk(αknσ−kn ) = V k(σ−kn ).
Taking
γkn = max
αk∈Ak
max
|σ−k−ρ−k|≤n
∣∣Gk(αkσ−k)−Gk(αkρ−k)∣∣
we see that Gk(αknρ
−k
n ) ≤ γkn . Since Gk is continuous on a compact set, it is uniformly
continuous and so γkn → 0. Moreover, if αkn ∈ Bkn , then clearly vk(αknρ−kn ) ≥ V kn(ρ−kn ).
The result now follows from Corollary 1. 
Leadership equilibrium
For ν > 0, define V kν (ρ
−k) = supαk∈Ak|Gk(αkρ−k)<ν vk(αkρ−k) and Bkν (ρ−k) to be the set
of plans αk satisfying Gk(αkρ−k)≤ ν and vk(αkρ−k)≥ V kν (ρ−k).
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Definition 15. We say that ρ is a strict ν equilibrium if ρk ∈H[Bkν (ρ−k)] for all k.
Theorem 6. Strict ν equilibria exist.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that Bkν is UHC. By Theorem 17.35 in Aliprantis and Bor-
der (2006), we then know that H[Bkν (ρ−k)] is also UHC. The existence of strict ν equilib-
rium then follows by Kakutani’s fixed point theorem.
Consider a sequence (αknρ
−k
n ) such that α
k
n ∈ Bkν (ρ−kn ). Suppose that limn→∞ αkn =
αk and limn→∞ ρ−kn = ρ−k. By continuity, Gk(αknρ−kn ) ≤ ν for all n implies that
Gk(αkρ−k) ≤ ν. Suppose by contradiction, vk(αkρ−k) < V kν (ρ−k). By the continu-
ity of vk, it follows that for sufficiently large n, we have vk(αknρ
−k
n ) < V
k
ν (ρ
−k). Since
vk(αknρ
−k
n ) ≥ V kν (ρ−kn ), this implies V kν (ρ−kn ) < V kν (ρ−k). Hence there is some αˆk such
that Gk(αˆkρ−k) < ν and V kν (ρ−kn ) < vk(αˆkρ−k). By continuity of Gk and vk, this in turn
implies that for sufficiently large n, we have Gk(αˆkρ−kn ) < ν and V kν (ρ−kn ) < vk(αˆkρ−kn ),
contradicting the definition of V kν (ρ
−k
n ). 
Theorem 7. The variable ρ is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the leader/evaluator
game if and only if it is a strict ν equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ρ is perfect Bayesian. Let μk and ηi be the corresponding leader and
evaluator strategies. It suffices to show that μk[Bkν (ρ−k)] = 1. Denote the equilibrium
utility of leader k by Uk.
Let Dkν be the subset of Ak for which Gk(αkρ−k) > ν. For αk ∈Dkν there is an i with
k(i) = k for whom it is optimal to choose ηi(αk)[αk] = 0; hence utility for the leader is
at most maxvk − P for those choices of αk. Suppose d = μk[Dkν ]> 0. Let αˆk ∈Ak satisfy
Gk(αˆkρ−k)= 0, which we know exists. Consider μˆk that takes the weight from Dkv and
puts it on αˆk. The utility from μˆk is at least (1 − d)Uk + d(Uk + minvk − maxvk + P),
which is bigger than Uk since P >maxvk −minvk. Hence d = 0.
Let D˜kν be the subset of Ak for which vk(αkρ−k) < V kν (ρ−k) − . Suppose d˜ =
μk[D˜kν ]> 0. Let α˜k ∈Ak satisfy Gk(α˜kρ−k) < ν and vk(α˜kρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k)− /2, which
we know exists. By evaluator optimality, we have ηi(α˜k)[αˆk] = 1 for all k(i) = k. Con-
sider μ˜k that takes the weight from D˜kv and puts it on α˜
k. The utility from μ˜k is at least
Uk + d/2, so d˜ = 0. Since Bkν (ρ−k)⊆Dkν ∪ D˜kν , we see that that indeed μk[Bkν (ρ−k)] = 1.
Now suppose that ρ is a strict ν equilibrium. Since ρk ∈H[Bkν (ρ−k)], there exist mea-
sures μk with μk[Bkν (ρ−k)] = 1 and ρk =
∫
σμk(dσ) so it suffices to find ηi that together
with μk forms a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Specifically for the given ρk, we show how
to choose evaluator optimal responses ηi to each αk such that the given μk are optimal
for the leader with respect to those evaluations. Start by choosing an optimal default for
the evaluators, i.e., a function α¯i(αk) ∈ argmaxαi ui(αiαkρ−k) that is measurable. We
define evaluator optimal responses ηi to αk by the leader in three cases depending on
the size Gk(αkρk) and vk(αkρ−k). Observe that it cannot be that Gk(αkρ−k) < ν and
vk(αkρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k), so we may omit consideration of that case.
(i) If Gk(αkρ−k) > ν, then ηi[α¯i(αk)] = 1. Note that in this case α¯i(αk) 	= αi for at
least one i.
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(ii) If Gk(αkρ−k)≤ ν and vk(αkρ−k)≤ V kν (ρ−k), then ηi[αi] = 1.
(iii) If Gk(αkρ−k)= ν and vk(αkρ−k) > V kν (ρ−k), some evaluator j is indifferent be-
tween αj and some ¯¯αj 	= αj (and this evaluator can be chosen in a measurable
way). For i 	= j, take ηi[αi] = 1. For j, choose ηj[ ¯¯αj] = (vk(αkρ−k)− V kν (ρ−k))/P
and ηj[αj] = 1−ηj[ ¯¯αj].
We now establish that for this evaluator, optimal response μk is indeed optimal for
the leader. If αk ∈ Bkν (ρ−k), the leader utility is exactly V kν (ρ−k), while if Gk(αkρ−k) > ν,
then leader utility is at most maxvk − P . Hence αk ∈ Bkν (ρ−k) is at least as good as any
other choice and is indifferent to any other choice in Bkν (ρ
−k). Since μk is a randomiza-
tion over Bkν (ρ
−k) for the leader, it follows that it is optimal. 
Lemma 2. We have V kν (ρ
−k)≥ V k (ρ−k) for any  > 0.
Proof. From
V kν
(
ρ−k
) = sup
αk∈Ak|Gk(αkρ−k)<ν
vk
(
αkρ−k
)
≥ sup
αk∈Ak|Gk(αkρ−k)=0
vk
(
αkρ−k
)= V k(ρ−k)≥ V k (ρ−k)
the stated inequality follows. 
Theorem 8. If ρn is a sequence of strict νn equilibria, νn → 0, and ρn → ρ, then ρ is a
collusion constrained equilibrium.
Proof. Let γn = νn and notice that for any αkn ∈ Bkνn(ρ−kn ), we have vk(αknρ−kn ) ≥
V kνn(ρ
−k
n ) ≥ V kn(ρ−kn ) by Lemma 2 for some sequence n → 0. The result now follows
from Corollary 1. 
Perturbed equilibrium: Existence and upper hemicontinuity
Theorem 9. A perturbed equilibrium exists for any perturbation.
Proof. Notice that for any perturbation, wk(αk r−kk (ρ
−k)) − Ck(αk r−kk (ρ−k)) is con-
tinuous in its arguments. By the maximum theorem, we then get that the correspon-
dence argmaxαk w
k(αk r−kk (ρ
−k))−Ck(αk r−kk (ρ−k)) is UHC. In turn, by Theorem 17.35
in Aliprantis and Border (2006), H[argmaxαk wk(αk r−kk (ρ−k)) − Ck(αk r−kk (ρ−k))] is
UHC. The existence of perturbed equilibria then follows from the Kakutani fixed point
theorem. 
Theorem 10. If ρ is justifiable, then it is a collusion constrained equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose ρ is justifiable. Then there exists a sequence of perturbations r−kkn ,
Ckn , w
k
n such that maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k) − ρ−k| → 0, Ckn is a high cost sequence, and
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maxαkρ−k |wkn(αkρ−k) − vk(αkρ−k)| → 0, each with a perturbed equilibrium ρn that
converges to ρ.
Let Bkwcn = argmaxαk wkn(αk r−kkn (ρ−k)) − Ckn (αk r−kkn (ρ−k)). Let v˜ = maxvk − minvk.
Let δn1 =maxαkρ−k |wkn(αk r−kkn (ρ−k))−wkn(αkρ−k)| and δn2 =maxαkρ−k |wkn(αkρ−k)−
vk(αkρ−k)|. Since Ckn is a high cost sequence, for all large enough n, Gk(αkρ−k) > γkn
implies Ckn (α
kρ−k) > 2(v˜ + δn1 + δn2) and, since maxρ−k |r−kkn (ρ−k) − ρ−k| → 0, also
Ckn (α
k r−kkn (ρ
−k)) > v˜ + δn1 + δn2. So for all sufficiently large n, αk ∈ Bkwcn means
Gk(αkρ−k)≤ γkn .
Let W kn (ρ
−k) = max
αk∈Ak|Gk(αkr−kkn (ρ−k))=0w
k
n(α
k r−kkn (ρ
−k)). Suppose αkn ∈ Bkwcn.
Then for large enough n, it must be that
wkn
(
αkn r
−k
kn
(
ρ−k
))≥W kn (ρ−k)≥ V kS (ρ−k)− δn1 − δn2
This in turn means
vk
(
αknρ
−k)≥W kn (ρ−k)− δn1 − δn2 ≥ V kS (ρ−k)− 2δn1 − 2δn2
Notice that the sets Bkwcn therefore satisfy the premise of Lemma 1 if we set the
scalars V kn equal to W
k
n (ρ
−k) − δn1 − δn2. So we know that ρ must be such that for all
k, ρk ∈H(Bk), where Bk is the set of αk that satisfies Gk(αkρ−k)= 0 and vk(αkρ−k)≥
lim infV kn . Finally note that
lim infW kn
(
ρ−k
)− δn1 − δn2 ≥ lim infV kS (ρ−k)− 2δn1 − 2δn2
⇒ lim infW kn
(
ρ−k
)≥ V kS (ρ−k)
Therefore, ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium. 
Perturbed equilibrium: Lower hemicontinuity
Theorem 11. If ρ is a collusion constrained equilibrium, then it is justifiable.
Proof. We are given a collusion constrained equilibrium ρ and want to find a se-
quence of perturbations with perturbed equilibria ρn → ρ. In fact the construction
we are going to suggest does something stronger: the idea is to construct a series
of perturbations with perturbed equilibria ρn = ρ that obviously converges to itself.
Recall that ρk ∈ H[BkS(ρ−k)]. The idea is to find a perturbed equilibrium so that
argmaxαk w
k
n(α
k r−kk (ρ
−k)) − Ckn (αk r−kk (ρ−k)) = BkS(ρ−k); then clearly ρk itself is in
H[argmaxαk wkn(αk r−kk (ρ−k))−Ckn (αk r−kk (ρ−k))].
Step 1. Choose, for each k, a sequence σ−kkn with σ
−k
kn → ρ−k and V k(σ−kkn ) →
V kS (ρ
−k). We know that we can find such a sequence by the definition of V kS (ρ
−k): it
is the limit of the worst of the local best, so there must be some sequence of local bests
that converges to it.
Constants. Define G
k
(σ−k) = maxαk |Gk(αkσ−k) − Gk(αkρ−k)|, G
k
n = Gk(σ−kkn ),
and, similarly, V (σ−k)= max{0 V k(σ−k)− V kS (ρ−k)}, V
k
n = V (σ−kkn ), and note that both
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G
k
n and V
k
n go to zero as n → ∞. Also let vk(σ−k) = maxαk |vk(αkσ−k) − vk(αkρ−k)|
and vkn = vk(σ−kkn ); observe that vkn → 0. Take λkn = 1/
√
G
k
n , which goes to infinity, κ
k
n =
3(vkn + V kn + λknGkn), which goes to zero, and γkn = 1/
√
λkn , which goes to zero.
The functions wkn(α
kσ−k) and Ckn(αkσ−k). Define first Dkn(αk) = max{0 vk(αk
ρ−k) − V kS (ρ−k)} + λknG(αkρ−k) and dkn(αk) = min{Dkn(αk)κkn}. This converges uni-
formly to zero. We then take C
k
n(α
kσ−k) = Dkn(αk) − dkn(αk) and wkn(αkσ−k) =
vk(αkρ−k)− dkn(αk). Observe that
wkn
(
αkσ−k
)−Ckn(αkσ−k)
= vk(αkρ−k)−Dkn(αk)
= vk(αkρ−k)−max{0 vk(αkρ−k)− V kS (ρ−k)}− λknG(αkρ−k)
=min{vk(αkρ−k) V kS (ρ−k)}− λknG(αkρ−k)
Key fact : argmaxαk w
k
n(α
kσ−k) − Ckn(αkσ−k) = BkS(ρ−k). To see this consider
the maximizers of min{vk(αkρ−k)V kS (ρ−k)} − λknG(αkρ−k). For the elements of
BkS(ρ
−k), that is, the αk for which G(αkρ−k) = 0 and vk(αkρ−k) ≥ V kS (ρ−k), the ex-
pression equals V kS (ρ
−k). Outside BkS(ρ
−k), that is, for αk such that Gk(αkρ−k) > 0 or
vk(αkρ−k) < VS(ρ−k), the expression is lower than that value. This proves the assertion.
Properties: There exists kn > 0 such that |σ−k − σ−kkn | ≤ kn implies the following state-
ments:
(i) If Gk(αkσ−k) > γkn , then C
k
n(α
kσ−k)≥ λknγkn − κkn − 2λknGkn → ∞.
(ii) If Gk(αkσ−k)= 0, then Ckn(αkσ−k)= 0.
(iii) We have |wkn(αkσ−k)− vk(αkσ−k)| ≤ 2vkn + κkn → 0.
Proofs of the implications.
(i) We have C
k
n(α
kσ−k)≥ λknG(αkρ−k)−κkn ≥ λknG(αkσ−k)−κkn −λknGk(σ−k), so
choose kn small enough that G
k
(σ−k)≤ 2Gkn .
(ii) Choose kn > 0 such that for all |σ−k − σ−kkn | < kn , we have maxαk |Gk(αkσ−k)−
Gk(αkσ−kkn )| ≤ G
k
n . Note that maxαk |Gk(αkσ−kkn ) − Gk(αkρ−k)| = G
k
n . Hence by the
triangle inequality, Gk(αkσ−k)= 0 implies Gk(αkρ−k)≤ 2Gkn .
Since V kS cannot jump up, we may choose 
k
n > 0 such that for all |σ−k − σ−kkn | <
kn , we have V
k
S (σ
−k) ≤ V kS (σ−kkn ) + vkn . Note that V kS (σ−kkn ) ≤ V kS (ρ−k) + V
k
n . Hence
V kS (σ
−k) ≤ V kS (ρ−k) + vkn + V
k
n . Therefore, G
k(αkσ−k) = 0 implies vk(αkσ−k) ≤
V kS (ρ
−k)+ vkn + V kn .
Finally choose kn > 0 such that for all |σ−k−σ−kkn |< kn , we have maxαk |vk(αkσ−k)−
vk(αkσ−kkn )| ≤ vkn . Hence by the triangle inequality, maxαk |vk(αkσ−k)− vk(αkρ−k)| ≤
2vkn .
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Putting these inequalities together we see that Gk(αkσ−k) = 0 implies that
Dkn(α
k) = max{0 vk(αkρ−k) − V kS (ρ−k)} + λknG(αkρ−k) ≤ 3vkn + V
k
n + 2λknGkn ≤ κkn ,
which in turn implies C
k
n(α
kσ−k)= 0.
(iii) Recalling that kn > 0 is such that for all |σ−k − σ−kkn |< kn , we have maxαk |vk(αk
σ−k)− vk(αkσ−kkn )| ≤ vkn , property (iii) follows from
∣∣wkn(αkσ−k)− vk(αkσ−k)∣∣
≤ ∣∣vk(αkσ−k)− vk(αkσ−kkn
)∣∣+ ∣∣vk(αkσ−kkn
)− vk(αkρ−k)∣∣+ dkn (αk)≤ 2vkn + κkn
Step 2. We now have wkn(α
kσ−k) and Ckn(αkσ−k) that are defined in an kn neigh-
borhood of σ−kkn and have the right properties there. For |σ−k − ρ−k| < kn , we define
r−kkn (σ
−k)= σ−kkn (taking advantage of the fact that these need not be the same for all k).
We must now extend these to functions wkn(α
kσ−k), Ckn (αkσ−k), and r−kkn (σ
−k) on all
of R−k while preserving the right properties and the values of wkn(αkσ−kkn ), C
k
n(α
kσ−kkn ),
and r−kkn (ρ
−k). We can do this with a simple pasting. Let βkn(x) be a nonnegative con-
tinuous real valued function taking the value of 1 at x = 0 and the value of 0 for x ≥ kn .
Then we define
wkn
(
αkσ−k
) = βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣)wkn(αkσ−k)+ (1−βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣))vk(αkσ−k)
Ckn
(
αkσ−k
) = βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣)Ckn(αkσ−k)+ (1−βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣))λknGk(αkσ−k)
rkn
(
σ−k
) = βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣)rkn(σ−k)+ (1−βkn(∣∣σ−k − σ−kkn
∣∣))σ−k
It is easy to check that these pasted functions have the correct properties. Note that
requiring wkn(α
kσ−k) and Ckn(αkσ−k) to have the right properties in the kn neighbor-
hood of σ−kkn ensures that the above convex combinations inherit those properties. 
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